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1 Introduction
Almost in all countries throughout the world, the population is aging over time. More particu-
larly, the developed countries will be the rst to face the challenges of this demographic change,
as their older population  persons 65 years or older  will on average reach one fourth of their
total population in three decades (See Figure 1). It is beyond any doubt that the pay-as-you-go
(PAYG ) nanced social security will be at the heart of the challenges that are being thrown by
the demographic changes, and concern about the future solvency of the social security program
has already resulted in a heated public policy debate (see Cooley and Soares (1999), Boldrin
and Rustichini (2000), Feldstein (2005) and Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) for example).
Most of the papers in the literature concentrate on social security in isolation, however, there
are some studies (see for e.g., Pogue and Sgontz (1977), Becker and Murphy (1988) among
the earlier works and more recently Rangel (2003), Boldrin and Montes (2005) among others)
that emphasize that the other elements of the welfare state, particularly the forward channel,
namely the education subsidy, should not be ignored. Aging population in the meanwhile also
changes the pattern of the intergenerational distribution of social expenditure. Bringing the
two-armed intergenerational transfers into the analysis not only makes the understanding of
the functioning of welfare state more accurate and complete, but also reveals some interesting
features of the welfare state.
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Figure 1: Population ages 65 and above (% of total), 2015-2100
(Data source: World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, United Nations)
This paper presents a comprehensive analysis when education and PAYG social security,
the two largest public programs in most economies, are politically determined. We particularly
focus on intergenerational cooperation and conict as well as the general equilibrium e¤ects of
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any policy decision that originates from a voting outcome and show that both these factors
have serious consequences on the states of the economy, i.e., the physical and human capital,
the two important engines of the growth. Since both education subsidy and pension are funded
by the working population, the generosity of these two programs is subject to intergenerational
cooperation and conict, and the social expenditure distribution hinges on the intergenerational
distribution of political power.1 Further in the political economy, agents take prices as given
when acting as consumers, but as rational voters, they internalize the general equilibrium e¤ect
of the policy choice on factor prices. As we proceed, it will become evident that the general
equilibrium e¤ects not only may help support the social security program, but also generate
a clear distinction between the e¤ects of public and private investment in education. Further,
they also explain why the presence of PAYG social security may not provide su¢ cient incentive
for education investment.
Apart from other issues, the present study also explores some of the interesting and timely
relevant questions such as whether the existence of social security could increase the incentive
of current working population to expand public investment in education, or as public education
program provides more generous funding in education investment, whether the enhanced future
productivity through augmenting education could help reduce the size of the social security
program, or more importantly whether a relatively recent suggestion of Boldrin and Montes
(2005), that educationsocial security should be implemented as a package, can survive under
the growing inuence of the old in the political process.
The framework we consider is a standard three-period overlapping generations economy
embedded with probabilistic voting. The voting power is distributed intergenerationally and
the vote-seeking candidates need to cater to the interests of all voters during the electoral com-
petition. Voters hold rational expectations and are allowed to sequentially choose the policies.
We focus on the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (henceforth MPE) of the voting outcomes.2 Our
choice of probabilistic voting is driven by its simplicity and we depend on MPE for obtain-
ing analytical results. But the additional gain from a probabilistic voting setup is that it can
capture intergenerational cooperation and conict, which is indeed the nature of competition
between education subsidy and social security. Here, the dynamic politicoeconomic equilibria
are founded on competitive equilibrium with subgame perfect tax rates and transfers since the
1As argued by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999), the political clout of the old people has grown beyond
what was predicted by the evolution of the demographics. They interpret the data in favor of the old as a
political power enjoyed by those citizens (also see Preston (1984), Lindert (1994)). As is mentioned in Song,
Storesletten and Zilibotti (2012), the voters turnout in the US is falling however, the participation of the old
is increasing. Further, they report that the share of vote cast by voters of 61+ age is expected to reach 50%
by the year 2050 in the OECD countries. These phenomena well explain that in the voting framework, the
equations are changing rapidly. These information may explain why even with signicant pressure on pension
funds, the idea of lowering the tax rate has not been considered by the researchers as such a policy would have
a very small chance of success in reality.
2For a discussion on MPE in overlapping generations framework, see Bhaskar (1998), Gonzalez-Eiras and
Niepelt (2008) among others.
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voters are not bound by their past political decisions. This complete analysis provides some
important results that are worth noting and summarized below.
Our rst observation conveys an important message that under MPE, establishing public
education program by probabilistic voting increases human capital but reduces physical cap-
ital accumulation. This happens because in our model, rational voters take into account the
positive general equilibrium e¤ects of education investment that materialize in their life-span
and therefore would support for a more generous funding for education compared to a situation
when the funding for education is private and therefore not politically determined. This re-
sult naturally implies that when the production technology is more human capital intensive, it
may increase the long run growth rate. More importantly, this higher level of public education
program (higher compared to the case when education is privately funded) however does not
guarantee a more generous social security. In fact we have been able to show that the generosity
of social security becomes lower in a logarithmic setup, despite the fact that the education level
is higher than before. This nding has a strikingly strong implication. It implies that the exist-
ing wisdom that when PAYG social security is present, introducing a forward intergenerational
good, namely publicly funded education, can be helpful since it enhances future productivity,
cannot hold under the political economy setup.
A separately signicant result of the paper reveals some of the important characteristics of
a two-armed welfare state. Firstly, we show that when public education program has already
been established, infusing a PAYG social security program will compete with public education
program for government revenue and crowd out public investment in education, depressing
the human capital accumulation. However, later we show that in a laissez-faire economy with
privately funded education, politically establishing the PAYG social security program, either
independently or together with a public education program as a package, increases human
capital accumulation if the political inuence of the old is limited and therefore the size of the
pension program is also limited. This happens because the small-sized PAYG social security, as
will be shown, can expand the family budget available for education investment. A substantially
thick pension which results from heavy inuence of the old, however, spoils this mutual benet.
Let us explain why the rst result mentioned in the previous paragraph is of our interest.
According to Pogue and Sgontz (1977), PAYG social security creates incentives for public
investment in education. Becker and Murphy (1988) also suggests that PAYG social security
strengthens the political support among the current working agents for public investment in
education. Their study connects education investment made by the parents with social security
by considering this as a trade among generations: children receive education from their parents
and in exchange pay for their old age benets. In a relatively recent work, Rangel (2003)
also focuses on the issue of sustainability when both forward and backward intergenerational
goods are present and shows that backward intergenerational goods (BIGs), such as social
security, play a crucial role in sustaining investment in forward intergenerational goods (FIGs)
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like education: without them investment is ine¢ ciently low, but with them optimal investment
is possible. In contrast to these partial equilibrium studies, Soares (2006) in a calibrated
general equilibrium OLG framework nds that infusing a PAYG system exogenously results
in a political equilibrium with lower funding for public education compared to the case when
social security is absent. This happens because, under PAYG scheme, the increased incentive
in investing in youngs education to expand future wage bill is cancelled out by the increase
in future interest rate, and thus the public education investment has no direct positive e¤ect
on the present value of social security benets (Kaganovich and Zilcha, 2012). Our rst result
mentioned in the preceding paragraph further conrms that their result holds even when PAYG
social security is endogenously determined. Below we explain the importance of the later result
that we have mentioned in the previous paragraph.
In Boldrin and Montes (2005), simultaneous existence of public education and PAYG so-
cial security is justied as a means to implement an intergenerational transfer scheme that
replicates complete market allocations.3 In our political economy setup, if the same question
arises as to whether a simultaneous arrangement of these two-armed intergenerational trans-
fers is justiable for the long run growth, the answer would depend on the intergenerational
distribution of political power and thus this particular result can be considered as a political
economy version of Boldrin and Montes (2005).4 An important result in this intergenerational
transfer literature is Rangel (2003) where an education - pension package can be supported by
trigger strategy argument which demands a continuation surplus. Therefore a heavy backward
payment incentivise investment in the forward arm. Our model points out that a su¢ ciently
heavy backward transfer cannot be cost less - it reduces the generosity of the forward arm and
therefore, a su¢ ciently heavy social security along with education subsidy as a package may
end up with a lower level of education and upset the mutual benet from these two intergen-
erational instruments. We show that a heavy inuence of the old in the political process can
guarantee a thick pension but will reduce investment in education and therefore spoil the entire
3Wang (2013) extends their study by endogenizing the imperfection of the credit market and shows that the
result could hold even when borrowing constraints for education loan arise endogenously. In another interesting
work, Andersen and Bhattacharya (2013) show that when the young must borrow to make the education
investment and the economy is dynamically e¢ cient, the golden rule level of human capital is higher than
that is achievable with complete education-loan markets alone. Further, they show that a carefully designed
education-pension welfare package can achieve e¢ cient education investment, and owing to the intergenerational
human capital externality, the pension component of such a package will be entirely phased out eventually.
4According to Docquier, Paddison and Pestieau (2007), the denition of optimality in Boldrin and Montes
(2005) framework is restrictive because the study disregards the e¤ect of externality in education. They show
that because of the externalities, allocations of human and physical capital in competitive equilibrium di¤er from
the planners and a possibility naturally arises where the laissez-faire equilibrium experiences higher physical
capital accumulation but lower human capital accumulation compared to the planners allocations. However,
Bishnu (2013) shows that if the origin of non-optimality of human capital accumulation is consumption exter-
nality, the possibility that the accumulation of human and physical capital in a laissez-faire will di¤er from the
planners in an opposite direction is not at all feasible. This observation not only has crucial implication on
pension and education subsidy but also can justify government intervention in education even in the absence of
education externalities.
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mutual benets from the existence of two intergenrational transfers. As a whole, ignoring the
intergenerational political inuence when considering channelizing funds will be a mistake if
policy implementations are considered under intergenerational conicts, especially when the
inuence of the aged is steadily increasing. The present paper can also be seen from an angle
where Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) appears as one of the special cases in which education
is truncated from the analysis.5 Naturally, in this light, the present paper seems more com-
plete and has the exibility to compare all the situations, specically both private and public
channels of investment in education and PAYG social security.
Here we must mention some other papers that also study education and social security in
unison and thus are related to our study. Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) consider an economy
with altruistically-motivated parents who invest in the human capital of their children, and
analyze how the allocation of the tax revenues between public education and social security
a¤ects growth and welfare. In their study, however, the total tax rate is articially xed and
the allocation of tax revenue is determined by a growth maximization problem. Pecchenino and
Utendorf (1999) study the impact of PAYG social security on incentives for private investment
in education and show that in an aging economy, social security may crowd out education in-
vestment and thus reduce growth and social welfare. Poutvaara (2006) uses trigger strategies
to characterize the political equilibrium of social security and public education in an economy
where agents are heterogeneous and decisions are taken by majority voting. In an open econ-
omy framework with xed factor prices, Naito (2012) also focuses on the sustainability of public
education and social security under probabilistic voting setup and investigates the interaction
between these two policies with economic growth. However in his study, the proportion of ex-
penditure on one program to the total expenditure is articially xed at some level. Kaganovich
and Zilcha (2012) study a political economy in which public education is determined through a
voting process but the social security tax rate is exogenously given. They show that compared
to PAYG, the fully funded social security system produces political support for a relatively
higher education funding, and hence generates higher rates of physical and human capital ac-
cumulation and economic growth. In a very recent study, Ono (2013) incorporates longevity as
well as altruism and allows voting on both social security and publicly funded education. Other
two papers that need to be mentioned are Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2012) and Lancia and
Russo (2013). While the rst one analyses the e¤ect of demographic aging and retirement on
long term growth, the second one focuses only on the characterization of general equilibrium.
5The paper that is technically close to ours is Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) which deals with a prob-
abilistic voting model (only on pension) with population growth in which they take into account the general
equilibrium e¤ects of the existing policy on the future outcome. Though we do not consider any population
growth, the essence of changing population is captured through the distribution of intergenerational voting
power. Song (2011) focuses on within generation heterogeneity and analyzes the interaction between social
security transfers and wealth inequality. He nds that higher inequality is associated with higher equilibrium
social security tax rates if social security redistributes within cohorts. This paper too relies on probabilistic
voting and uses MPE, however like Gozalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008), ignores the education channel of transfers.
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Our paper captures the political economy more broadly and comprehensively when preferences
are altruistic. Some of the earlier studies that considered the link between public education and
public social security are Richman and Stagner (1986), Cremer, Kessler and Pestieau (1992)
among others.
Thus by comparing the e¤ects of the two di¤erent sources of funding for education (both
separately and in unison) along with PAYG in a political economy framework, where both
the intergenerational conict and the general equilibrium e¤ects are considered, the present
paper certainly distinguishes itself from the existing literature. The study not only provides a
comprehensive analysis which was somehow ignored in the literature, it also clearly suggests
that a partial framework that ignores the crucial e¤ects mentioned above may produce di¤erent
results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model, that
is, the laissez-faire economy. In section 3, we present three voting scenarios where di¤erent
instruments are politically determined through a probabilistic voting. Section 4 deals with
the policy implication of the intergenerational transfers and we present our main results there.
While section 5 concludes, proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Laissez-faire Economy
We consider an economy that consists of an innite sequence of three-period lived overlapping
generations, an initial old generation and an initial middle-aged generation. In each generation,
there is a continuum of identical agents of measure one.6 Agents receive education when young,
while they work and carry out decisions of consumption, saving and education investment for
their children during middle age. When they are old, the agents retire and consume out of the
total return on their savings. An agent who is working at period t; that is a middle-aged agent
in t, is called a generation-t agent.
Denote by ht the human capital of an individual belonging to generation t. The human
capital of a generation t + 1 agent is a function of the educational expenditure et she makes
when young and her parents human capital ht, the endowment of basic knowledge she is
born with. We assume the human capital is produced by a constant-return-to-scale technology
is given by ht+1 = h(et; ht) = Be

t h
1 
t , B > 0,  2 (0; 1).7 There is a single nal good
produced with a constant returns to scale production function F (Kt; Ht), where Kt and Ht
6If we introduce population growth, the political weight of the old, the variable that reects the intergnera-
tional distribution of political power and will be dened later, becomes != (1 + nt), where nt is the population
growth rate at period t. To focus on the e¤ects of intergenerational distribution of political power on the welfare
states and also to get the analytical results, we for simplicity make this constant population assumption and
therefore disentangle the e¤ects of distribution of political power from that of population growth.
7Most of our results hold for a human capital specication that abstracts from generational human capital
externalities, that is, where ht+1 depends on et only.
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are aggregate physical capital and human capital respectively at t. Dening kt  Kt=Nt and
ht  Ht=Nt in which Nt is the population of generation-t agents, output per middle-aged agent
at time t can be expressed as an intensive form f (kt; ht) = F (kt; ht). We assume that f takes
the Cobb-Douglas form, i.e., f (kt; ht) = Akt h
1 
t , A > 0;  2 (0; 1). Since the measure of
the members of each generation is one, we know Nt = 1 and thus kt = Kt and ht = Ht.
The nal good can either be consumed in the period it is produced, or it can be saved to
provide capital in the following period. Capital is conveniently assumed to depreciate fully
between periods. Young agents supply labor inelastically in competitive labor markets, earning
a wage of wt = @f (kt; ht) =@ht = (1  )Akt h t at time t; similarly, capital is traded in
competitive capital markets, and earns a gross real return of Rt+1 between t and t + 1 where
Rt = @f (kt; ht) =@kt = Ak
 1
t h
1 
t .
We assume a generation-t agent draws utility from (cmt ; c
o
t+1; ht+1), the terms in the paren-
thesis denoting consumption at middle age and old age, and the level of human capital of her
children respectively. More specically, the life-time utility for a generation t agent is
U  u(cmt ) + 

u
 
cot+1

+ u (ht+1)

(1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the standard discount factor and  2 (0; 1) represents the relative weight
assigned to the utility that an old agent enjoys from her childrens human capital, expressing
parentsaltruism towards their o¤spring.8 Instantaneous utility function u is continuously dif-
ferentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. An agent when middle-aged allocates her
labor income among consumption, saving and investment in education for her children.9 Saving
st while middle-aged returns stRt+1 in the next period when the agent is old. These imply that
cmt = wtht   st   et and cot+1 = stRt+1. Thus given the factor prices, human capital production
technology ht = h (et 1; ht 1) and the budget constraints stated above, when a generation t
agent maximizes her utility (1) with respect to fst; etg, we arrive at the following rst order
8Utility specication that represents altruism through the level of human capital of the next generation is
very common and vastly used in the literature. Our specication is simple and standard, for example, as in
Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), Pecchenino and Utendorf (1999) Glomm and Kaganovich (2003, 2008) and in
line with Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), De la Croix and Doepke (2003) among others.
9As is common treatment in the literature, we, in this paper, do not bring a credit market that can fund
education for the young. The entire discussion here are on two sources of funding, private investment (made
by parents) and public investment (made by the government), due to the following considerations. First, these
two sources are the main sources of funds in any economy. Second, owing to the inalienability of human capital,
future labor income cannot be collateralized and credit markets severely restrict any borrowing against future
human capital for education purposes. A credit market for education loan even does not exist in most developing
countries, e.g., China or trivially thin as in India. Third, the present setup allows us to derive analytical results.
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conditions10:
u0
 
wtht   sLt   eLt

= Rt+1u
0  Rt+1sLt  (2)
u0(wtht   sLt   eLt ) = u0 (ht+1)
@h
 
eLt ; ht

@eLt
: (3)
While equation (2) represents the optimal intertemporal consumption allocation, that is the
standard Eulers equation, (3) indicates that the marginal sacrice in utility from investing
in education of the descendents is equal to the marginal benet from utility gain adjusted to
the gain in the level of human capital of their descendents. To derive closed-form solutions of
political equilibrium and economic growth, we must impose functional form restrictions on the
utility function (1). Specically, we assume that the utility function is logarithmic. By solving
the above two rst order conditions, we get the following:
eLt =

1 +  + 
wtht (4)
and
sLt =

1 +  + 
wtht: (5)
Using the above along with the equilibrium factor prices and the fact that the general-
equilibrium condition kt+1 = st holds at every t, we obtain a two-dimensional rst-order
dynamical system of this economy, given by kLt+1 =  (1  )Akt h1 t = (1 +  + ) and
hLt+1 = B [A (1  ) = (1 +  + )] kt h1 t : Given k0 and h0, all the dynamic competi-
tive equilibria are characterized by the sequences of

kLt ; h
L
t
	
that satisfy the two equilibrium
paths expressed above. Given this dynamical system, we complete our characterization for this
laissez-faire economy by focusing on the steady state equilibrium and thus we have the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 In the laissez-faire economy, there exists an unique steady state with balanced growth
where the human and physical capital grow at a same constant rate.
3 Political Economy
In this section we consider the same framework as before but introduce two oppositely directed
policies, namely public education and PAYG social security to investigate the roles they play
in an economy. We bring these two intergenerational welfare states through a political process
10Superscript L represents the optimal and equilibrium values of the concerned variables in the laissez-faire
economy. Similarly, the superscripts G, P and X are used to represent the optimal and equilibrium values of
the concerned variables in the political economy of public education, political economy of pension and political
economy of two-armed intergenerational transfers analysis as in subsections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 respectively.
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which runs under a probabilistic voting framework (see Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)), and the
economy politically determines the size of these programs to be implemented.
In particular, we investigate three political economies. The choices of the political economies
are such that we can get a complete understanding of all possible scenarios. The rst scenario
is the Political economy of public education presented in subsection 3.1. In this economy,
the only political decision made by the agents is to determine the level of public investment
in education. That is, the government collects tax revenue from the middle-aged agents and
channelizes it to the present young to provide funds for their education. The second scenario
is the Political economy of social security which is presented in subsection 3.2. This economy
deals with another instrument of welfare state but it is a backward intergenerational good,
namely social security. However, in this case, we keep the source of education funding private
as in the laissez-faire economy, but introduce public social security benet in the form of a
politically determined PAYG social security. The last two scenarios bring out the e¤ects of
the instruments when they are present in an economy in isolation. Thus, as a last policy
experiment, in the Political economy of two-armed intergenerational transfers, we bring both
of the two instruments together through a political process that simultaneously determines
these two intergenerational goods. With these three policy environments and the laissez-faire
economy presented above, we can not only explore the political equilibrium of public education
and PAYG social security, but can also examine their roles in all possible scenarios.
3.1 Political Economy of Public Education
We rst consider a modication of the laissez-faire economy, where social security is absent
but the agents politically determine the size of the public education program. Suppose the
government imposes a proportional tax rate t at each t on the income earned by each of the
generation t agents when they are middle-aged to nance the public education program for
the present young. The scal program of subsidy needs to satisfy the period-wise balanced
budget condition, i.e., et = twtht. The tax rate t is determined by a repeated political
process (to be discussed below in detail) at the beginning of each period. After the political
process of voting is complete and the education tax rate is set, agents make their decisions on
consumption and savings. Given the factor prices, education policies and the human capital
production technology, a generation-t agents optimization problem now is to maximize (1)
subject to cmt = (1   t)wtht   st and cot+1 = stRt+1. Then given t, the rst order condition
with respect to st is given by
u0

(1  t)wtht   sGt

= Rt+1u
0  Rt+1sGt 
10
which ensures the optimal saving
sGt =
(1  t)wtht
1 + 
: (6)
Next, we solve the political equilibrium under a repeated voting process where only middle-
aged and old participate. Abiding by the standard practice as discussed earlier, we disallow
the youngs participation in the voting process due to age-restriction. At the beginning of
each period, the contemporaneous tax rate is determined by a candidate who is democratically
elected by all the current voters. We assume that the size of the program is determined in a
probabilistic-voting framework. Under this political setting, there are two political candidates
who are competing in an election. When deciding on which candidate to support, voters
anticipate the e¤ects of the candidates policy platform on equilibrium prices, futures political
decisions and their own welfare. As we mentioned earlier we focus on the MPE where agents
can form perfect foresight on the policies which depend on the set of state variables of the
economy. For rest of the analysis, we use the notation St to denote the set of state variables
in period t, i.e., St  fkt; htg. Since winning the election is the only aim of the candidates, in
the probabilistic-voting Nash equilibrium, the two candidates seeking to maximize their vote
shares propose the same policy platform. This policy platform maximizes a weighted average
of the welfare of all voters, in which the weights assigned to di¤erent groups of voters reect
the size or the political power of di¤erent generations.
By the foregoing discussion, the political decision on the equilibrium education policy can
be derived by maximizing the weighted sum of the indirect utilities of two generations, i.e.,
max
t2[0;1]
W  St; t = !V ot  St; t+ V mt  St; t ; (7)
where V mt and V
o
t denote the welfare of the middle aged and the old respectively at period t given
the state St. The parameter ! is the political weight assigned to the old relative to a middle-
aged by the political candidates. In line with the explanation by Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2012), this relative weight captures the relative political clout of each generation, reecting,
on one hand, its relative size and on the other hand, exogenous group-specic characteristics,
such as the voting turnout or the salience of the scal policy for that group relative to other
issues. In our model, the young receive education, but (7) shows that this particular generation
is not allowed to vote and thus is completely dependent on others for investment in education.
It should be noted that although the young have no role in the voting process, the middle-aged
have an incentive to invest in education for the future generation since they directly derive
utility out of the level of education accumulated by their descendents. Not only that, agents
also could acquire higher returns on their saving in the next period through general equilibrium
e¤ects.
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To characterize the political decision on the public education investment, we rst consider
the welfare e¤ect of this equilibrium education tax t on various groups of voters, i.e., the
middle-aged workers and the old retirees. Evidently, the education tax t imposed in period t
has no welfare e¤ect on the current old, i.e., @V ot =@t = 0. This follows directly from the fact
that all the variables, i.e., ht, Rt and st 1, in the utility function of the old in period t, that is
in V ot = u (Rtst 1) +u (ht), are pre-determined in t. For the middle aged, the welfare e¤ect of
education tax is more complex. Di¤erentiating V mt () with respect to t yields
@V mt
@t
=  u0 (cmt )wtht| {z }
A
+ u0 (ht+1)
@ht+1
@t| {z }
B
+ sGt u
0  cot+1
0BB@@Rt+1@kt+1 @kt+1@t| {z }
C
+
@Rt+1
@ht+1
@ht+1
@t| {z }
D
1CCA : (8)
Note that the e¤ect of t on the savings of the middle aged cancels out by the envelope theorem.
The rst negative term A reects the cost of investment in public education. The second
term B captures the positive e¤ect of public education through tax enjoyed by the parental
generation because of altruism. As previously discussed, the last two terms C and D reect the
general equilibrium e¤ect of public education tax on the rate of interest through the channel
of physical and human capital respectively. On one hand, by directing funds as a forward
intergenerational good to the next generation, the education tax t reduces private savings in
period t and consequently also reduces the physical capital investment, which eventually leads
to an increase in the rate of interest in the next period. That is, @Rt+1=@kt+1 < 0 along with
@kt+1=@t < 0. On the other hand, channelizing more funds towards the education of the next
generation necessarily increases the level of human capital of the descendents, which in turn,
also increases the rate of interest, i.e., @Rt+1=@ht+1 > 0 along with @ht+1=@t > 0.11 The
aggregate general equilibrium e¤ect of investment in public education is thus positive for the
middle-aged workers with C > 0 and D > 0.
Under MPE, the equilibrium tax rate is the xed point in t (St) = arg maxt2[0;1]W (St; t).
We rst substitute the factor prices, the equilibrium condition for market clearing and the
private optimal savings sGt given by (6) into W (St; t). Then, by omitting the terms that are
independent of the policy parameter t, the political objective function W (St; t) reduces to12
W  St; t ' (1 + ) ln(1  t) +  (1   + ) ln t.
By solving the rst order condition of the above probabilistic-voting problem, i.e., by setting
@W (St; t) =@t = 0, we nally have the following lemma:
11Note that under our specic functional form of the human capital production, @ht+1=@t =
Be 1t h
1 
t wtht.
12In all that follows, we will use the notation ' to denote the e¤ective value function that contains the
relevant scal parameter but not the other irrelevant terms.
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Lemma 2 In a political economy with public education determined in a probabilistic-voting
setting, there exists an unique interior education tax rate G under MPE and is given by
G   +  (1  )


2 (0; 1)8t
where 
 = 1 +  +  (1  ) +  > 1.
Lemma 2 shows that, under the logarithm utility, the equilibrium education tax is indepen-
dent of the states of the economy and thus is constant over time.13 Using the equilibrium condi-
tions and the balanced budget program of the government, the two-dimensional rst-order dy-
namical system of this economy can be written as kGt+1 =

A(1  G) (1  ) = (1 + ) kt h1 t
and hGt+1 = B

GA (1  ) kt h1 t . Given k0 and h0, all dynamic, competitive equilibria
are characterized by sequences of

kGt ; h
G
t
	
that satisfy the above two equilibrium paths.14
Finally we must mention that although we exclude from here private investment in educa-
tion, relaxing this assumption, i.e., allowing parents to invest in childrens education, will not
change the results. The following corollary shows that private investment in education cannot
coexist with publicly provided education that is made available through the political process of
voting.
Corollary 1 In the political economy of public education, private investment in education is
optimally driven to the zero corner when a politically determined public education is in place.
3.2 Political Economy of Pension
We now proceed to consider an economy that politically implements only a social security
program. Just as in a laissez-faire economy discussed in section 2, a proportional tax  t is
imposed at period t on the wage income earned by a generation t agent: The total tax revenue
is then collected and used up to provide PAYG social security bt to the old generation at t.
The governments budget balance requirement for this program ensures bt =  twtht: The social
13If we consider non-constant population, then the equilibrium education tax is still independent of the
states of the economy, but it will depend on the population growth rate and therefore will change over time. In
particular, if nt is the population growth rate at period t, the equilibrium tax rates will turn out to be
Gt  
1  +  (1 + nt+1)

t+1
; Pt =
!    (1 + nt) 
t+1= (1  )
! + (1 + nt) 
t+1
;
Xt =
 [1  +  (1 + nt+1)] = (1  )
! + nt (1 + ) + 
t+1
; Xt =
!    [nt (1 + ) + 
t+1] = (1  )
! + nt (1 + ) + 
t+1
;
where 
t+1 = 1 +  +  (1  ) +  (1 + nt+1).
14A point to note here is that the political economy relies on the welfare maximizing tax rates. This paper
does not deal with the issue of growth maximizing tax rates and it can be checked that welfare and growth
maximizing tax rates are generally not same. For example, in this particular case, the growth maximizing
education tax rate is 1  , which is di¤erent from G.
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security tax rate,  t, is determined in the same political setting as in section 3.1. Given the
factor prices, human capital production technology, the social security program and the budget
constraints, a generation t agents optimization problem now involves maximizing (1) subject
to cmt = (1   t)wtht st et and cot+1 = Rt+1st+bt+1. Thus given  t, the rst order conditions
with respect to (et; st) are given by
u0

(1   t)wtht   sPt   ePt

= u0 (ht+1)
@ht+1
@et
and
u0

(1   t)wtht   sPt   ePt

= Rt+1u
0  Rt+1sPt + bt+1 :
Solving the above two simultaneously results in the following equilibrium values of ePt and s
P
t :
ePt = 
(1   t)wtht + bt+1=Rt+1
1 +  + 
(9)
and
sPt =
 (1   t)wtht   (1 + ) bt+1=Rt+1
1 +  + 
: (10)
As in section 3.1, we next consider the welfare e¤ects of the social security tax  t on the
middle-aged workers and the old retirees. Di¤erentiating the utility of the old with respect to
 t yields @V ot =@ t = u
0 (cot )wtht > 0: Since the old benet from the social security program
without bearing any cost, it is evident that they always prefer a tax rate that is as high as
possible. Compared to the political economy of public education, in which the utility of the
present old is not at all a¤ected by the tax rate on education, either directly or through the
general equilibrium e¤ect, here in the presence of backward intergenerational goods, e.g., PAYG
social security, the old will have a role to play in the political decision making process.
By using the governments balanced budget condition bt =  twtht, market clearing condition
kt+1 = st, and the factor prices, the welfare e¤ect of social security tax  t on a generation t
agent is15
@V mt
@ t
=  u0 (cmt )wtht| {z }
E
+ u0
 
cot+1
0BB@ t+1wt+1@ht+1@ t| {z }
F
+ wt+1ht+1
@ t+1
@ t| {z }
G
+H
1CCA (11)
15By the envelope theorem, the e¤ect of Pt on the savings and education investment of the middle aged
cancels out.
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where
H = sPt
0BB@@Rt+1@kt+1 @kt+1@ t| {z }
H1
+
@Rt+1
@ht+1
@ht+1
@ t| {z }
H2
1CCA+  t+1ht+1
0BB@@wt+1@kt+1 @kt+1@ t| {z }
H3
+
@wt+1
@ht+1
@ht+1
@ t| {z }
H4
1CCA :
The rst negative term E reects the direct cost of social security contributions. The second
term F captures the e¤ect of social security tax which reduces the level of education of the
next generation and consequently the transfer benets that the present middle aged generation
receives when old. Explicitly, this e¤ect of social security tax on the level of education acquired
by the next generation can be derived from the expression of equilibrium ePt (equation (9)) and
also by using the equilibrium prices as follows:
@ht+1
@ t
=
ht+1
(1   t)wtht + bt+1=Rt+1

 wtht + @ ( t+1wt+1ht+1=Rt+1)
@ t

| {z }
I
: (12)
According to (9), the investment decision of private education completely relies on parents
life-time income, and the social security a¤ects the human capital accumulation by changing
the present value of parentslife-time income (1   t)wtht + bt+1=Rt+1 through two di¤erent
channels: 1) by directly reducing the wage income of the middle aged, it crowds out parental in-
vestment in childrens education and 2) by indirectly changing the equilibrium factor prices and
the future social security program, it changes the present value of future social security benet
bt+1=Rt+1. Note that in equilibrium, bt+1=Rt+1 =  t+1wt+1ht+1=Rt+1 = (1  )  t+1kt+1= and
therefore I =  wtht + (1  ) =@ ( t+1kt+1) =@ t. As will be shown below, in equilibrium  t+1
is independent of  t. This together with the fact that @kt+1=@ t < 0, results in the negativity
of the second indirect e¤ect. As a result, I as well as @ht+1=@ t < 0 is negative. The third term
G captures the e¤ect of the current tax choice on the future tax outcome and will be cancelled
out if the equilibrium tax rate is independent of the states of the economy.
The last term H reects the general equilibrium e¤ect of social security tax through the
channel of physical and human capital on the factor prices. By shifting income from the
middle-aged to the old, the PAYG social security reduces savings as well as the physical capital
investment. The e¤ect of social security tax on the physical capital investment is thus negative
i.e., @kt+1=@ t < 0. Here the movements of capital in terms of backward intergenerational
goods not only decreases the level of physical capital in the future, thus increasing the rate of
interest, but also decreases the level of investment in human capital for the next generation,
consequently reducing human capital in the future. This in turn leads to an opposite e¤ect
(compared to physical capital) on the rate of interest. We see a similar thing happening with
the other factor price, namely wages. While wages fall owing to the fact that there is a loss in
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physical capital due to backward transfer, we will also expect the price of human capital to be
augmented since human capital also goes down in the future. Thus, unlike the previous case of
political economy of public education, there is always a tension between the two opposite e¤ects
of two types of capital on the factor prices. Therefore H1 and H4 are positive and H2 and H3
are negative, with the result that the sign of the aggregate general equilibrium e¤ect of the
social security tax, H, is ambiguous. Indeed this particular result has support from the existing
literature. As emphasized by, for e.g., Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) and Gonzalez-Eiras and
Niepelt (2008), the general equilibrium e¤ect is very crucial in sustaining the social security
program in equilibrium. Our analysis in a di¤erent framework, in fact, shows that the general
equilibrium e¤ect is also possible to help PAYG program sustainable.
In equilibrium, as usual, political candidates who maximize their respective vote shares
propose the same policy platform and maximize the combination of the welfare of all voters,
which is given by W (St;  t) = !V ot (St;  t) + V mt (St;  t). First by substituting the factor
prices, private optimal savings and education investment (expressions (10), (9)), and imposing
the equilibrium condition kt+1 = st in W (St;  t), and then by omitting the terms independent
of policy parameter  t, the political objective function W (St;  t) reduces to
W  St;  t ' ! ln [ +  t (1  )] + 
 ln (1   t) :
Following Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008), we here make a conjecture that future equilibrium
policy  t+1 is independent of current political choice of  t, which will be veried to be indeed
the case. Solving the rst order condition of the probabilistic-voting problem, i.e., by setting
@W (St;  t) =@ t = 0, we have
Lemma 3 In a political economy with PAYG social security determined in a probabilistic-voting
setting, there exists an unique social security tax rate P under MPE and is given by
P =
!   
= (1  )
! + 

< 1 8t:
Under logarithmic utility, the equilibrium social security tax is independent of the states of
the economy, verifying the conjecture we made above.16 By using the governments balanced
budget condition bt =  twtht, and the market clearing condition kt+1 = st, the dynamical
system of the economy can be written as kPt+1 = Ak

t h
1 
t = [ + ! (1 +  + ) =
] and
hPt+1 = Bk

t h
1 
t fA!= [( + ! (1 +  + ) =
) (! + 
)]g. Given k0 and h0, all dy-
namic, competitive equilibria are characterized by sequences of

kPt ; h
P
t
	
that satisfy the two
16A point to note here is that our analysis can generate the results in Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) as a
special case. Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) uses a two-period overlapping generations model that features
a positive population growth nt in order to study the pension tax. If we impose  = 0 to shut out the education
investment in our model, the equilibrium pension tax is P = [!    (1 + ) = (1  )] = (! + 1 + ) , which
is exactly equal to the result of Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) with nt = 1.
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equilibrium paths as expressed above.
3.3 Political Economy of Two-Armed Intergenerational Transfers
While in the previous two subsections we deal with only one scal instrument at a time, this
subsection deals with the situation when both the forward and backward intergenerational
goods are present, that is, when the economy is two-armed. In this setting, the government has
two public programs and the budget balance conditions require et = twtht and bt =  twtht
where t and  t are the education and social security tax rate respectively imposed on the
wage income of the middle-aged workers. Given the tax rates, an agent maximizes (1) subject
to cmt = (1  t    t)wtht   st and cot+1 = Rt+1st + bt+1.17 Solving the generation t agents
optimization problem, we obtain
sXt =
(1  t    t)wtht   bt+1=Rt+1
1 + 
: (13)
We will now consider the welfare e¤ects of social security tax and education tax on the
middle-aged workers and the old retirees. It can be veried that for the old, (given  t) the
welfare e¤ect of education tax, i.e., @V ot =@t = 0, and (given t) the welfare e¤ect of social
security tax, i.e., @V ot =@ t = u
0 (cot )wtht, remain same as in the previous cases. Since neither
of the two public policies can modify the current states of the economy, there can only be the
direct e¤ect of taxation on the old. Further, it can be veried that (given t) the welfare e¤ect
of social security tax on the middle-aged is the same as in the case (see equation 11) in which
only the social security policy is present; however, (given  t) the welfare e¤ect of education tax
changes to
@V mt
@t
= J + u0  cot+1 @ ( t+1wt+1ht+1)@t| {z }
K
(14)
where J denotes the right hand side of (8). Further, when a social security tax accompanies an
education tax, the term K represents an extra welfare e¤ect of education tax on the middle-aged
where
@ ( t+1wt+1ht+1)
@t
=  t+1wt+1
@ht+1
@t
+  t+1ht+1

@wt+1
@kt+1
@kt+1
@t
+
@wt+1
@ht+1
@ht+1
@t

+ wt+1ht+1
@ t+1
@t
:
(15)
As we can see K captures the welfare e¤ect of education tax that the agents pay in the middle
age on the social security benet that they will receive in the future when old. As discussed pre-
viously, the general equilibrium e¤ects of public education are @kt+1=@t < 0 and @ht+1=@t > 0;
17In order to make the model consistent with that in subsection 3.1, we here also exclude the private invest-
ment in education from agents choice set.
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along with @wt+1=@kt+1 > 0 and @wt+1=@ht+1 < 0. Given the sign of these e¤ects along with
the fact that @ t+1=@t = 0 (as will be shown below), the sign of K becomes indeterminate.
Note that in the economy where only education policy is in existence and is politically
determined, the middle aged agents support the education tax because they can gain from
the investment in public education through parental altruism as well as from the positive
general equilibrium e¤ect of education tax on the interest rate. Our analysis conrms that
in the presence of social security, the e¤ect of education tax is not necessarily positive. The
result explains that introducing PAYG may not increase the benets from public education
monotonically. This is in contrast to the existing results that appear in Pogue and Sgontz
(1977), Becker and Murphy (1988) and Rangel (2003), where the authors based their study in a
partial equilibrium framework. They argue that since the enhanced human capital of the next
generation can increase the future social security benet, the presence of social security would
increase the incentive of the middle-aged to invest in public education. In fact, in (15), if we
drop all the terms that are related to the general equilibrium e¤ects, that is, except the rst
term, we can verify that an increase in education will have benecial e¤ect on the generosity of
social security when old, given @ht+1=@t > 0. This is in the same spirit as the key result of the
above three papers mentioned above. However, the result changes once the general equilibrium
e¤ects are taken into account and this somewhat supports the ndings by Soares (2006) and
very recently by Kaganovich and Zilcha (2012).18
In equilibrium, the objective function for the political candidates becomes W (St; t;  t) =
!V ot (St; t;  t)+V mt (St; t;  t). By substituting the agents optimal savings (13), governments
balanced budgets for the two programs, factor prices and equilibrium market clearing condition
into W (St; t;  t), and then dropping the irrelevant terms, the political objective function
W (St; t;  t) reduces to
W  St; t;  t ' ! ln [ +  t (1  )] + (1 + ) ln (1  t    t) +  (1   + ) ln (t) :
The optimal tax rates are simultaneously determined in a repeated probabilistic voting. We
solve for the two tax rates by solving the two rst order conditions @W (St; t;  t) =@t = 0
and @W (St; t;  t) =@ t = 0 simultaneously. As before, we make the conjecture that the future
equilibrium policy  t+1 is independent of current political choice of t and  t and will verify
that it is indeed the case. Solving the MPE for this probabilistic-voting problem gives us the
following lemma.
Lemma 4 In a political economy with public education and PAYG social security determined
in a probabilistic-voting setting, there exists a unique set of instruments
 
X ; X

under MPE
18Soares (2003) shows that public funding in education may well be a consequence of a purely selsh behavior
of agents. It does not have to be supported as an instrument of altruism. It can instead be accounted for by
the existence of borrowing constraints and the presence of factor complementarity.
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where X = P and
X =
 (1   + ) = (1  )
! + 

2 (0; 1) 8t:
Under logarithmic utility, the equilibrium social security tax is independent of the states of
the economy, verifying the conjecture. Under this repeated stage game, every subgame thus
has an unique Nash equilibrium. This in fact conrms that this is the unique Nash equilib-
rium for the entire game. Thus the short run taxes that have been obtained simultaneously at
each period t, are valid not only for each t but also valid for the long run. Using these two
equilibrium tax rates, the equilibrium market clearing condition and the budget constraints,
the two-dimensional rst-order dynamical system of the economy can be written as kXt+1 =
 (1 + )Akt h
1 
t = [! +  (! + 
)] and h
X
t+1 = B [A (1   + ) = (! + 
)] kt h1 t . Given
k0 and h0, all dynamic, competitive equilibria are characterized by sequences of

kXt ; h
X
t
	
that
satisfy the above two equilibrium paths. Finally we end the section by presenting the steady
state equilibrium for the above three political economies.
Lemma 5 In each of the three political economies presented above, there exists a unique steady
state with balanced growth where the human and physical capital grow at a same constant rate.
4 Policy Consequences
Economic growth is mainly driven by the accumulation of physical capital and human capital.
As two of the largest public transfer programs in most economies, public education and social
security exert signicant inuence on the accumulation of these two types of capital and thus
on the long run growth. In this section, we are particularly interested in how these two public
programs exert that inuence in a political economy. When the government is short-lived
and commitment issue is subtle, the outcome in the period-wise voting represents the true
wishes of an economy in terms of the allocation of resources. Moreover, as mentioned in the
introduction, there is a wide variety of studies on these two transfers, but most of them are in
isolation from the other. The results could be misleading if we ignore the presence of the other
policy due to the possible interaction between the two intergenerational transfers in a political
economy. The unied framework that we present here allows us to compare19 the results of
di¤erent treatments of these two intergenerational transfers, something that have been done
only partially in previous studies. In this process we end up with some interesting results that
are presented below.
We focus on two important aspects of intergenerational transfers when there are conicts
of interests among generations. First we study the e¤ects of politically establishing these two
19Whenever a comparison is made in our analysis, we naturally assume that the state variables at period t are
same for all the cases. Changes appear from t+1 and the crucial variables are represented with the superscripts
then.
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large public programs both individually as well as jointly. Second, we investigate the role that
is played by the relative inuence of the old in the political process when both programs are
present. This is more important because developed and developing countries are experiencing
signicant demographic change where the proportion of old people in the population is steadily
increasing.
We rst examine the case of public education in a political economy. In all that follows, we
particularly concentrate on the e¤ects of the intergenerational transfer policy on the short run
accumulation of both human and physical capital as well as their growth in the long run.
Proposition 1 (1) Politically establishing a public education program always increases (de-
presses) human (physical) capital accumulation, and therefore can boost the long run growth
when the production technology is intensive in human capital, i.e.,  is small. However,
(2) the increase in human capital does notnecessarily guarantee a generous social security
in the future.
Since establishing a public education program has no economic gain to the current old re-
tirees, evidently it is the middle aged agents who decide the education investment in the political
process. As a voter, when deciding on investment in education, besides the altruism e¤ect, the
rational middle-aged agent also takes into account the afore-discussed (positive) general equilib-
rium e¤ect of education investment which she is unaware of as a consumer. As a consequence,
the education investment optimally chosen in the political process is higher than the private
education investment. If we disregard the general equilibrium e¤ect of education investment in
the voting process, i.e., C and D in (8), the investment in public education would be exactly
equal to the investment in private education, adjusted to per unit tax. Implementing public
education however reduces physical capital accumulation as expected, because the increase in
education investment expands the tax burden of the middle aged, which would in turn crowds
out their savings. Since public education generates countervailing e¤ects on the accumulation
of physical capital and human capital, if the production function is human capital intensive,
i.e.,  is small, then the human capital enhancement e¤ect dominates so that public education
ensures higher growth in the long run.
It has been argued in the literature that by suitably extending the forward arm, backward
arm that is social security can be stable and welfare improving. An implied view is that if
todays middle aged generation increases their investment in the young generations education,
the productivity of future working population can be amplied, and therefore they can enjoy
higher social security benet when old. However, Proposition 1 shows that, although the public
education program provides more funding for investment in the next generations education
than private parental investment, if PAYG social security is politically determined, the increase
in the level of education does not at all guarantee an increase in the social security benet.
Since according to Lemma 4, politically establishing a public education program has completely
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no impact on the equilibrium social security tax rate, i.e., X = P , we have to admit that
politically establishing public education program may increase the current value of future social
security benet,  t+1wt+1ht+1, due to the enlarged human capital ht+1. However it is not at all
guaranteed since in the meanwhile the future wage rate wt+1 also falls due to the increase in ht+1,
as well as the decrease in kt+1. Further, the changes in the levels of both human and physical
capital also drives up the future interest rate Rt+1, which may well reduce the present value of
future social security benet. More specically, in our logarithmic setup, the present value of
future social security benet,  t+1wt+1ht+1=Rt+1, in equilibrium equals to  t+1 (1  ) kt+1=,
which in fact decreases.
We next consider the policy implication of politically establishing a PAYG social security
program. As is standard in the literature, implementing the PAYG social security always de-
presses physical capital accumulation, no matter whether the education investment is privately
or publicly funded. However regarding the policy implications of social security on human
capital accumulation, the funding source of education investment matters.
Proposition 2 (1) In an economy that already has an established public education program,
politically establishing a PAYG social security always depresses the human capital accumulation.
(2) In a laissez-faire economy, politically establishing a PAYG social security, independently
or together with a public education program, can increase human capital accumulation if and
only if the political inuence of the old is small (less than a particular threshold value of !)
so that the size of the social security program is limited. 20A substantially thick social security
scheme spoils this mutual benet.
The rst result of Proposition 2 reects the conicts of interests among generations in the
public policy decision making. As mentioned before, the old have no interest in establishing a
public education program and it is the middle-aged who make this investment decision during
the political process. As voters, the middle-aged need to balance the marginal cost and marginal
benet of this investment. Note that the public education investment reduces the family budget
available for the middle-age consumption as well as physical capital investment and hence its
marginal cost is the aggregate value of the marginal utility of the forgone consumption during
the middle and old age. Since PAYG social security taxation further reduces the family budget
of the middle aged, due to the concavity of the utility function, the marginal cost for the same
level of public education investment would be higher than before. On the other hand, the
benet of middle-age education investment is a higher level of human capital in the future.
In particular, the future old-age consumption in equilibrium is [ + (1  )  t+1]Akt+1h1 t+1 ,
and under logarithmic utility, the middle-age contribution to the social security has no e¤ect
on the value of the marginal increase of future human capital. As a consequence, politically
20Since ! is the key to the intergenerational conicts or cooperation, we use the parameter ! when comparing.
See the proof in the appendix for the two threshold values of !.
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establishing a PAYG social security increases the marginal cost of public education investment
without making any contribution to its marginal benet. If we compare the two equations
@W (St; t) =@t = 0 and @W (St; t;  t) =@t = 0, which are shown respectively in the proof of
Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, it can be seen that the marginal benet part in these two rst order
conditions are exactly same while the marginal cost part di¤ers by the term  t.
Evidently when the public education program is already present, introducing a PAYG social
security program would compete with public education for government revenue and therefore
crowds out the public funding for the public education program, depressing the human capital
accumulation. Moreover, higher political weight of the old yields higher social security tax
rate, which in turn would crowd out more public investment in education. Since politically
establishing a PAYG social security program adversely a¤ects both physical and human capital
accumulation, the long run growth would denitely be depressed in this case. It needs to be
stressed that because public education has been in existence in the history for several hundred
years, and the PAYG social security came into the picture only in the twentieth century, the
result has a very important implication for the real economies. It suggests that the public
education investment and long run growth would generally be hurt if an economy decides to
implement PAYG social security through a voting process.
Proposition 2, however, also shows that when education is privately funded in the laissez-
faire economy, politically establishing a PAYG social security program can help stimulate invest-
ment in education, generating more human capital accumulation than the laissez-faire under a
no commitment voting equilibrium. We show that when political weight of the old is relatively
small, the political candidate would choose a mild (limited) social security at the equilibrium
when the education regime is private. Thus a political economy that consists of high education
and limited social security can well be an equilibrium outcome. However, a heavy relative inu-
ence of the old demands a substantially high social security benet which spoils the benets of
coexisting education and social security and in fact leads to an education level that is less than
the laissez-faire. In this part 2 of Proposition 2, we present two possible cases. The rst situa-
tion is one where the education regime is private and social security is chosen by voting. The
second case represents a situation when initially the education regime is private but a package
comprising of public education and public social security is implemented through voting. The
later one can be considered as a political economy version of Boldrin and Montes (2005) where
public education - public social security are implemented as a package.
Let us explain the results under part (2) of the Proposition 2 when social security is infused
separately. The parents completely rely on their own income to make the private education
investment decision and would increase the investment in childrens education if and only if
the present value of the life-cycle income increases. When education is privately funded, for a
middle aged agent, social security program reduces the current income by  twtht but increases
her future income by  t+1wt+1ht+1. Thus whether politically establishing a PAYG social security
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program will increase the education investment completely depends on whether the benets
from future social security can dominate the tax loss at middle age, i.e.,  t+1wt+1ht+1=Rt+1 >
 twtht, or equivalently wt+1ht+1=Rt+1 > wtht. Here both wt and ht are predetermined but
wt+1, ht+1 and Rt+1 would be all a¤ected by the newly established social security program. As
previously mentioned, establishing a PAYG social security program always reduces the physical
capital accumulation, which would in turn increase Rt+1 and depress wt+1, but when the relative
political power of the old retirees ! is small so that the public social security program is limited,
the physical capital accumulation is less adversely a¤ected and could still be high.21 In this
case, if leaving ht+1 unchanged, the future interest rate Rt+1 would be relatively low and the
future wage rate wt+1 would be relatively high, both of which would in turn contribute to the
higher present value of wt+1ht+1=Rt+1. If ! is su¢ ciently small, wt+1ht+1=Rt+1 could be high
enough to overcompensate the loss in income wtht at present and thus the present value of
life-cycle income may increase. An enhanced life cycle income of the parents then guarantees
higher investment in childrens education at the equilibrium. The opposite happens when the
political power of the old is su¢ ciently high so that the PAYG social security program is large.22
The result that we present in the second case under part (2) is also very intuitive. We
have shown in Proposition 1 that as public education program is established in an economy, it
always increases the human capital investment no matter whether the PAYG social security is
present or not. But on the other hand, politically establishing PAYG social security program,
as shown in the part (1) of Proposition 2, would discourage public education investment. The
human capital investment thus can be enhanced (compared to the laissez-faire private human
capital investment) if and only if the PAYG social security is limited so that its e¤ect on public
education investment is also limited. This particular nding is related to some of the inuential
studies in the literature. In fact this results can be seen as a political economy version of the
work of Boldrin and Montes (2005) which rationalize the simultaneous establishment of the two
programs purely on e¢ ciency grounds. Their inuential study conrms that when a market for
borrowing funds for education is absent, a properly designed education - social security package
is capable of generating the complete market allocation. In our political economy setup, if
we focus on the e¤ects of these transfer policies on the long-run growth and verify whether
simultaneous establishment of these two-armed intergenerational transfers are justiable, the
answer depends on the distribution of the political power. Simultaneous subsidy on education
and social security would hurt the long-run growth of the economy when inuence of the old is
21Note that the equilibrium social security tax P is monotonically increasing in the relative political power
of the old retirees !. In addition, it can easily be veried that there exists a weight ! (b! in the proof of the
above proposition) at which P equals to zero. Hence the equilibrium social security tax is positive if and only
if !  b!, and we are focusing only on the situation when pension tax rate is positive.
22Using 1995 and 2002 household survey data and di¤erence in di¤erence model, Sun and Yi (2014) nd
that the 1997 social security reform in China, which cut down the replacement rate of employeesocial security
benet from 80% to 58.5%, signicantly increased the household education investment.
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very high so that the social security program is very substantial. It may benet the long-run
growth of the economy when the relative inuence of the old is limited so that human capital
accumulation is increased and the production technology is intensive in human capital, i.e., 
is small. One more signicant result in this literature is Rangel (2003) where an education
- pension package is supported by trigger strategy argument which demands a continuation
surplus. Thus a heavy backward payments incentivise investment in the forward arm. Our
model points out that a problem that a su¢ ciently heavy backward transfer is not cost less - it
may reduce the generosity of the forward arm and therefore, a su¢ ciently heavy social security
along with education subsidy as a package may end up with a lower level of education and
upset the mutual benet. Thus a heavy inuence of the old in the political process may reduce
the investment in education.
In both the two situations mentioned in part (2) of Proposition 2, the overall message is
that when higher level of education is concerned, there exists a situation where a mild social
security scheme is better compared to a situation with no social security. This result indicates
a positive side of the existence of public social security where a mutual benet of higher level
of education (compared to laissez-faire) and a limited social security can very well coexist at
the cost of reduced physical capital. However, when the inuence of the old steadily increases
and it becomes substantial, it demands thick social security benets which may hurt education
and results in an education level that is lower than the level that the laissez-faire guarantees.
5 Conclusion
This study reveals some important results which make our understanding of the e¤ects of
the intergenerational transfer policies clear. In this paper, whenever we consider a policy,
we allow the economy to endogenously determine its size and therefore all the policies are
endogenous. Further, the government is short-lived and they cannot commit to the future
policies. Agents on the other hand are subject to intergenerational cooperation and conict on
the issue of intergenerational transfers and as rational voters they internalize all the e¤ects of
their policy choices that materialize in their life-span. In this natural setting, we reveal some
interesting observations. First we show that when public education is introduced in an economy
through a political process of voting, it always reduces the accumulation of physical capital but
increases the accumulation of human capital. This is because of a natural assumption that
rational agents internalize all the e¤ects of the policy outcomes, including the positive general
equilibrium e¤ects that materialize during their life time. This e¤ect is however not realizable
in a competitive equilibrium with private funding of education. A stronger result that emerges
is that even with an increase in the level of education under the public regime, the generosity of
social security may actually fall. This is in contrast to the popular wisdom that changing the
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public funds available for education may ease the payments for PAYG social security in future.
On the other hand, we have been able to show that introducing politically determined
public social security most denitely reduces physical capital accumulation. We explain why
the presence of social security may not provide su¢ cient incentive for investment in education,
a belief that arises from the present literature. Later we show that when education regime
is private, in both the situations when public social security is introduced separately as well
as when public education - public social security are implemented as a package, the economy
experiences an increase in education but the necessary condition for this is that the public
pension program has to be limited. Limited pension in our paper results from a limited political
inuence of the old in the political process. Thus a mutual benet of higher level of education
(compared to laissez-faire) and a limited social security can well coexist at the cost of reduction
in physical capital. Since public social security therefore has two countervailing e¤ects on
physical and human capital, securing a higher growth is feasible in our framework too but for
that the inuence of the old has to be limited. A substantial social security program however
is not cost less - it spoils this mutual benet and results in an education level that is less
than the level that laissez-faire generates. Thus, if the question arises whether simultaneous
arrangement of these two-armed intergenerational transfers are justiable for an increase in the
long run growth, the answer in our model would depend on the distribution of political power
among generations. But human capital will be reduced with certainty if and only if the public
education is already present in the economy and the benets of public education has already
been realized.
A nice extension to this study would be to accommodate fertility and longevity since we can-
not ignore the e¤ects of these in our framework, especially when the intergenerational equations
are changing rapidly. We leave this for our future study.
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6 Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. First, using the expressions for the paths of capital accumulation, we
have
kLt+1
hLt+1
=
[A (1  )]1 
B (1 +  + )1  ()

kLt
hLt
 
:
Then by denoting k
L
t+1  kLt+1=hLt+1; we can observe that k
L
t+1 is concave in k
L
t with limkLt !0 k
L
t+1 =
0 and lim
k
L
t !0 dk
L
t+1=dk
L
t =1. Hence there exists a unique non-trivial steady state value of k
L
which is given by
k
L
=
(
[A (1  )]1 
B (1 +  + )1  ()
) 1
1 (1 )
:
Further, at the steady state, the growth rate of the human capital is given by
hLt+1
hLt
= B

A (1  )
1 +  + 
 
k
L

=
(
B1  ()(1 ) [A (1  )]
(1 +  + )
) 1
1 +
,
which is a constant. It is straightforward to verify that this is also the steady state growth rate
for physical capital. Hence the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Note that Gt is the solution to the rst order condition,
@W  St; t =@t =  (1   + )
Gt
  1 + 
1  Gt
= 0
It is to be noted that Gt = 
G 8t. Further, we can verify limt!0W (St; t) = limt!1W (St; t) =
 1, and @2W (St; t) =@2t < 0 so that the second order su¢ cient condition is satised. Hence
the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. When both the sources of education investment are present, agents
maximize (1) subject to cmt = (1   t)wtht   dt   st, cot+1 = Rt+1st, et = dt + gt and dt  0,
where t is the education tax rate, dt and gt are the new notations we use for private and
public investment in education (we in fact use these notations for this proof only). With the
assumption of logarithmic utility and governments budget balance, gt = twtht, we have
dt =
8><>:
  t(1 +  + )
1 +  + 
wtht, if t <

1 +  + 
0; if t  
1 +  + 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and
st =
8><>:
wtht
1 +  + 
; if t <

1 +  + 
(1  t)wtht
1 + 
; if t  
1 +  + 
:
Next we solve the political equilibrium of education tax rate. First, when t < = (1 +  + ),
that is when dt > 0, we have
W  St; t ' [ (1  ) + ] ln [  t ( + )] .
The maximum occurs when t = 0, which guarantees that dt > 0 along with t > 0 can-
not coexist. Secondly, when t  = (1 +  + ), that is when dt = 0, as shown in
Lemma 2, the political equilibrium of education tax rate is t  G. We can verify that
G > = (1 +  + ) holds since this is equivalent to (1  ) +  [1 + (1  )] > 0 which
is true.
Proof of Lemma 3. It is easy to check that Pt is the solution to @W (St;  t) =@ t =
0. It can also be veried that @2W (St;  t) =@ 2t < 0 with lim t!0W (St;  t) = ! ln and
lim t!1W (S;  t) =  1. Hence the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since education subsidy and social security tax are simultaneously
chosen under a Nash setting, one tax rate is determined assuming the other tax rate is given at
the optimum level. Thus, we nd out the optimal tax rates
 
Xt ; 
X
t

by simultaneously solving
the two rst order conditions as follows:
@W (St; t;  t)
@ t
=
! (1  )
 + Xt (1  )
  1 + 
1  Xt   Xt
= 0
@W (St; t;  t)
@t
=
 (1   + )
Xt
  1 + 
1  Xt   Xt
= 0:
It can also be veried that the Hessian of W (St; t;  t),0@   !(1 )2[+Xt (1 )]2   1+(1 Xt  Xt )2   1+(1 Xt  Xt )2
  1+
(1 Xt  Xt )
2   1+
(1 Xt  Xt )
2   (1 +)
(Xt )
2
1A ;
is negative denite so that the second order su¢ cient condition is satised. Hence the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5. This proof follows the same approach of Proof of Lemma 1. First we
can show that for each political economy, there exists a unique non-trivial steady state value
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of k
i
t  kit=hit, i = fL; P;Xg, which are respectively given by
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:
Further, we can show that for each political economy, at the steady state, both human and
physical capital grow at a constant rate and are respectively given by
hGt+1
hGt
= B

GA (1  ) kG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hPt+1
hPt
= B
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A
 
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Hence the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of Part 1 relies on (a) the comparison between 
eLt ; k
L
t+1

and
 
eGt ; k
G
t+1

, and also on (b) the comparison between
 
ePt ; k
P
t+1

and
 
eXt ; k
X
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
element-wise.
(a) We compare between
 
eLt ; k
L
t+1

and
 
eGt ; k
G
t+1

here. To prove eGt > e
L
t , we need to show
that G > = (1 +  + ) and for kGt+1 < k
L
t+1, we have to show that (1 + ) = (1 +  + ) >
(1  G). Using the equilibrium value of G, it is straight forward to verify that both the above
conditions are equivalent to the condition  (1  ) (1 +  + ) =
 > 0, which always holds
given our specications.
Further, the long-run growth rate in the political economy with public education is higher
than that in the laissez-faire economy if and only if
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> 1 holds at the
steady state. Since
 
hGt+1=h
G
t

=
 
hLt+1=h
L
t

is continuous in , to prove part 2, it is enough
to show that
 
hGt+1=h
G
t

=
 
hLt+1=h
L
t

> 1 holds when  = 0. Given  = 0, some algebra
yields
 
hGt+1=h
G
t

=
 
hLt+1=h
L
t

=

G (1 +  + ) = ()

, which is larger than one by directly
following the proof presented above.
(b) As mentioned above, here we compare between
 
ePt ; k
P
t+1

and
 
eXt ; k
X
t+1

. Using the
equilibrium factor prices, government budget and the expression for kPt+1, some tedious algebra
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yields the equilibrium investment in education
ePt =
!

(! + 
) [
 + ! (1 +  + )]
Akt h
1 
t :
In addition, we have eXt = 
X
t wtht =  (1   + )Akt h1 t = (! + 
), from which we can get
eXt   ePt =
Akt h
1 
t
! + 


 (1   + ) + ! (1  ) (1 + )

 + ! (1 +  + )
> 0:
Further, it is straightforward to show that
kPt+1
kXt+1
=
! + 
= (1 + )
! (1 +  + ) =
 + 
:
Since it can be veried that (1 +  + ) =
 < 1 and 
= (1 + ) > 1, obviously we have
kPt+1=k
X
t+1 > 1.
Finally, it can be easily veried that
 
hXt+1=h
X
t

=
 
hPt+1=h
P
t

> 1 holds when  = 0. Hence
the proof of the rst part.
The second part of the proof follows directly from the discussion under the proposition in
the main text.
Proof of Proposition 2. First we need to note that the PAYG social security tax rate is
non-negative if and only if !  b!  
= (1  ). Then given ! > b!, it can be easily checked
that
eGt
eXt
=

1 +
!



(1  )  1:
Hence the proof of the rst part.
The proof of part (2) relies on the comparison of eLt with e
P
t and e
X
t respectively.
(a) Here we compare between eLt and e
P
t . It is straight forward to check that
eLt
ePt
=
1  
1 +  + 

1 + 2 + +
!2 (1 +  + ) + 
2
!


;
from which we know the comparison of eLt with e
P
t depends on the value of !. Taking derivative
of eLt =e
P
t with respect to ! yields
@
 
eLt =e
P
t

@!
=
1  
1 +  + 

1 +  + 


  

!2

:
Evidently eLt =e
P
t is convex in ! for all t, along with e
L
t =e
P
t ! 1 as ! ! 0 or ! ! 1. Hence
either eLt =e
P
t = 1 has two roots or e
L
t =e
P
t > 1 for all !. It can be checked that b! is one of the
solutions to eLt =e
P
t = 1. Therefore there must exist another root of e
L
t =e
P
t = 1. Denote e! as the
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other root for eLt =e
P
t = 1. By solving e
L
t =e
P
t = 1, we have
e! =  (1  ) 

1 +  + 
:
Further, it can be checked that
@
 
eLt =e
P
t

@!

!=b!
=
 + + 2   

:
Thus + + 2    ? 0, b! ? e! and since eLt =ePt is convex in !, we must have eLt < ePt
for ! 2 [e!; b!] or [b!; e!] depending on which root is bigger, and clearly eLt > ePt 8 ! =2 [e!; b!] or
[b!; e!].
(b) Now we compare eLt with e
X
t . It can be veried that
eLt
eXt
=
 (1  )
1 +  + 

 +
1 +  + !
1   + 

:
Evidently there exists a threshold value ! where
! =
(1 +  + ) (1   + )   (1  ) (1 + )
 (1  )
such that eLt  eXt holds if and only if !  !. Just to mention that there is no reason to believe
that the threshold values under (a) and (b) are the same - as shown above, they are di¤erent.
Hence the proof.
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